The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery. — Plato, The Republic (Book VIII)
Man is like a divine shit — he fell out of God’s anus
Source: dshooker
Marathon Man (1976, John Schlesinger; Cinematographer: Conrad L. Hall)
SPOILERS
“Do you think anyone cared about Victor Frankl or admired his humanity until he gave them Man’s Search for Meaning?” - David Foster Wallace (Brief Interviews With Hideous Men)
And so he runs. One man flees for his life, ensnared in a convoluted power-play of fascism, fascism that changes faces and geography but never its simple but efficient binary that turns human beings into non-entities, shells for labor, commerce, and information. In 1976, when John Schlesinger’s Marathon Man hit theaters, New York City was feeling the shift. Overwhelmed with crime, the police came harder than ever, singling out problem areas, then problem groups. Race was a factor, as it always is. Films like Death Wish and Taxi Driver confronted the power of the pistol with bloody spectacle - could violence stop violence? Has it ever?
That a pistol is the prominent motif in Marathon Man, a movie similarly controversial for its stark look at violence, suggests an ingrained fear of the weapon as agency, and as an inescapable link to the crimes of the past. Babe, played by Dustin Hoffman, keeps the pistol his father used to commit suicide, a death spurred by accusations of communist sympathies during the McCarthy era, in his dresser drawer, while he works tirelessly on a scathing thesis about tyranny. His teacher is quick to illustrate the revenge fantasy implicit in Babe’s words, and this cannot be denied, the paper on Babe’s desk is just the eloquent representation of the firearm inside of it.
The thesis and the weapon trade places halfway through the film, the former forgotten as the stakes rise and Babe tries desperately to avoid using the symbol for fascism that killed his father, and overshadowed Babe’s own life since he was a child, on his oppressors. And so he runs, hoping that like his hero, marathoner Abebe Bikila, he will eventually push through to some sort of tangible catharsis, a ribbon stretched across the road, signaling his victory, and his freedom.
But who is Babe? Is he his father’s son? Babe’s teacher explains without malice that he will never fill those footsteps, that he can only create his own, individual mark. When Babe’s brother, Doc, is murdered, Babe becomes his sibling’s facsimile, running from Doc’s pursuers, failing to answer questions and relay information that only Doc could understand. Perhaps Babe belongs to the collective Jewish diaspora. A memorable scene in which Babe is tortured at length by a former Nazi doctor links his personal crises, and continued flight, to that of the Holocaust and the Jewish exodus, but despite the repeated implications of Jewishness, never in the film does he describe himself as such. Suffocating under the weight of multitudinous identities, Babe becomes not an amalgam of his influences, but a complete rejection of them – a nothing.
Victor Frankl, a neurologist who, in Man’s Search for Meaning, documented his three years in a concentration camp, understood that there is no such thing as inherent humanity, that one must claim it. As David Foster Wallace suggested, Frankl was not, could not be, an entity until he wrote that he was one. He had gone through and seen things under the Nazi regime that should have destroyed him, but he survived with a tenacity of will that he constructed to combat the very forces that would have him deny that will’s existence. In the climax of Marathon Man, unable to outrun himself, Babe claims his own humanity. The gun goes into a reservoir, and he finally purges the object that took away both his father’s life and his own, but not before using it against his enemies, and understanding the convoluted autonomy of force - that those pulling the trigger and those running from it become equally oppressed, mirrors at the crux of tyranny.
Source: theillstills
Citizen Philosophers
Teaching Justice in Brazil
Carlos Fraenkel »In 1971 the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985 eliminated philosophy from high schools. Teachers, professors in departments of education, and political activists championed its return, while most academic philosophers were either indifferent or suspicious. The dictatorship seems to have understood philosophy’s potential to create engaged citizens…
The official rationale for the 2008 law is that philosophy “is necessary for the exercise of citizenship.” The law—the world’s largest-scale attempt to bring philosophy into the public sphere—thus represents an experiment in democracy. Among teachers at least, many share Ribeiro’s hope that philosophy will provide a path to greater civic participation and equality. Can it do even more? Can it teach students to question and challenge the foundations of society itself? >continue<
Source: bostonreview.net
Blessed are the hearts that can bend; they shall never be broken.
Source: poolsandpearls
1 Thing Today: Isocracy, Isonomia, Isonomy
Isonomia is any policial system based on popular rule of the people. Isonomy is an English word derived from Isonomia and it means equality under the law.
An isocracy is based on isonomia and isonomy and is a hybrid of republicanism, socialism and anarchism as a reaction to some of the…
Source: Wikipedia
““What is most dangerous in violence is its rationality. Of course violence itself is terrible. But the deepest root of violence and its permanence come out of the form of the rationality we use. The idea had been that if we live in the world of reason, we can get rid of violence. This is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no incompatibility.””— Michel Foucault, (1996) [1980]. ‘Truth is in the future’. In Sylvère Lotringer (ed.) Foucault Live (Interviews, 1961-1984). (via foucaultscat)
This is a disturbing isolation of content from context; Foucault would never himself advocate such an appeal to rationality. The inference here, that in rationality, there exists compatibility with violence, there by virtue of rationality, also exists virtue in violence, is patently false. Only the irresponsible isolation of this message and our own need to justify violent acts leads us to this latent conclusion.
He is in fact cautioning, as John Ralston-Saul does, the mis-use of rationality, the pursuit of it to a point of rebellion described by Camus as “irresolvable”. The criticism in this quote is of the faulty premise that reason is itself moral. It is not. Just as truth—as Foucault points out—does not belong to the order of power, neither does truth, or morality for that matter, belong to rationality’s domain. The fluctuating nature of truth, and the amoral (not immoral; but ‘unconcerned with morality’) character of truth and rationality are plain elements of Foucault’s discourse.
That there is no “incompatibility” between violence and rationality is not a tacit indicator of a similar lack of incompatibility between violence and morality: all we’ve disproved is the containment of morality within rationality, which to Foucault is innocent and disinteresting (as it was to Nietzsche, although perhaps not “disinteresting”), but to us is a victim of highly-interested polemical mis-use.
As we should come to understand in the post-God universe, we are no longer bound by rationality to morality, just as we are no longer bound to it by divine authority. We are bound to it very simply by our recognition that it has value, and our acts in relation to others reach a limit which is recognized within ourselves—not, externally, from rationality, divinity, or some other system a priori.
Source: handprintstares
I said that the world is absurd, but I was too hasty. This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart.
Well, yeah, of course.
Source: nietzscheinrevolt


